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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 Jill Mancini, a former assistant county solicitor in 
Northampton County, Pennsylvania, brought this 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 action against Northampton County, County Executive 
John Brown, and County Solicitor Victor Scomillio, in 
connection with their termination of her employment.  
Mancini, a Democrat, alleged that she was a protected career 
service employee and that the newly elected Republican 
administration wrongfully dismissed her in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the First 
Amendment.  A jury found that Northampton County, but not 
Brown or Scomillio, violated Mancini’s procedural due 
process rights and awarded her $94,232 in damages.  The jury 
found in favor of all Defendants on Mancini’s First 
Amendment claims.  We conclude that the able trial judge 
appropriately handled the numerous issues raised by the 
parties, and we will affirm. 
 
 This case requires us to consider whether there is an 
exception to the ordinary requirements of procedural due 
process when a government employee with a protected 
property interest in her job is dismissed as part of a 
departmental reorganization that results in the elimination of 
her position.  We have not previously considered this so-
called “reorganization exception.”  We hold that a 
reorganization exception to constitutional procedural due 
process cannot apply as a matter of law where, as here, there 
is a genuine factual dispute about whether the reorganization 
was pretext for an unlawful termination. 
 
I.  
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A. Factual Background 
1. Mancini’s Employment in Northampton 
County 
 
Mancini began her employment with Northampton 
County in 2001 as a part-time assistant district attorney.  In 
December 2006, the Northampton County Council approved 
a request from Karl Longenbach, then County Solicitor, to 
create one full-time assistant county solicitor position.  Prior 
to that time, the Northampton County assistant solicitors were 
all part-time employees.  The County Council eliminated a 
vacant part-time assistant county solicitor position when it 
created the full-time position.  In February 2007, Mancini was 
hired into the newly created full-time position, which she 
believed was part of the Northampton career service.  In 
2012, the Northampton County Council created a second full-
time assistant county solicitor position, which was filled in 
early 2013.   
  
In November 2013, Defendant John Brown was 
elected County Executive of Northampton County.  He 
tapped Defendant Victor Scomillio to serve under him as 
County Solicitor.  Before taking office, Brown and Scomillio 
decided that they would make changes to the staffing of the 
Solicitor’s Office.  According to Mancini, Scomillio told her 
on December 23, 2013, that her position would be eliminated 
on January 7, 2014. 
   
On January 7, 2014, Brown formally requested that the 
County Council eliminate the two full-time assistant county 
solicitor positions and replace them with two additional part-
time positions.  Mancini filed a grievance that same day 
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challenging her forthcoming dismissal on numerous grounds, 
including that her discharge violated Northampton’s Home 
Rule Charter, its Career Service Regulations, and 
Northampton County Employee Policy No. 3.525, “Reduction 
in Force and Recall” (the “Layoff Policy”). 
   
The County Council acted on Brown’s request on 
January 23, 2014, eliminating the two full-time positions and 
creating the requested part-time positions.  Mancini’s last day 
of work was Friday, January 24, 2014, the last business day 
before the reorganization took effect.  She was suspended 
with pay until her February 17, 2014 termination.  Mancini 
was not offered either of the newly created assistant county 
solicitor jobs, and she was not permitted to displace an 
existing part-time assistant county solicitor. 
   
Mancini did not receive formal written notice of her 
termination until a letter dated January 27, 2014, advised her 
that on January 23 her position had been eliminated.  The 
elimination of her position was the only ground Northampton 
provided for Mancini’s dismissal.  In the notice, the County 
took the position that the “full time assistant county solicitor 
positions were career exempt positions.”  J.A. 3416. 
 
Northampton County held an informal hearing on 
Mancini’s grievance on February 19, 2014, two days after it 
stopped paying her, and nearly a month after she was relieved 
of her duties.  She was not permitted to have counsel present 
at the hearing.  The County denied Mancini’s grievance.  
Mancini appealed to the Northampton Personnel Appeals 
Board (the “Board”), which held two hearings on her 
grievance—one in May 2014 and one in June 2014.  Months 
passed with no decision.  Finally, in response to an inquiry 
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from her lawyer, the Board informed Mancini by letter dated 
November 19, 2014, that the Board was “hopelessly 
deadlocked.”  J.A. 3425.  No further action was taken on 
Mancini’s appeal, and the Board never reached or 
communicated a final decision to Mancini.   
 
 
2. The Northampton County Career Service 
Under the Northampton Home Rule Charter, members 
of the career service can only be dismissed for “just cause” 
and they have the right to appeal to the Northampton 
Personnel Appeals Board for a pretermination just cause 
determination.  See id. at 3326, 2688.  The distinction 
between career service and exempt service has important 
consequences for Northampton employees, and for our 
analysis of Mancini’s due process claim.  While Mancini’s 
status as a career service employee is not at issue on appeal, it 
was contested at trial. 
   
The Northampton Home Rule Charter1 states that all 
County employees “shall be members of the career service,” 
except for nine discrete categories of exempt employees.  Id. 
                                              
 1  Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, counties “have 
the right and power to frame and adopt home rule charters.”  
Pa. Const. art. IX, § 2.  A county “which has a home rule 
charter may exercise any power or perform any function not 
denied by this Constitution, by its home rule charter or by the 
General Assembly at any time.”  Id.; see 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
2961.   
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at 3325.  We agree with the parties that Mancini’s position 
did not fall within the meaning of any one of the nine 
enumerated exemptions.2  The Resolution that created 
Mancini’s full-time assistant county solicitor position did not 
state whether the position was exempt or career service.  
However, former County Solicitor Longenbach testified that 
he intended the full-time assistant county solicitor position to 
be part of the career service, and that he believed the position 
the County Council approved, and that Mancini occupied, 
was, in fact, a career service position.  Linda Markwith, a 
personnel analyst in the Northampton County Human 
Resources Department responsible for recruitment and hiring 
when Mancini was hired as a solicitor, testified that 
Mancini’s position was designated as career service from the 
outset and the designation never changed.  An email from 
Markwith to Longenbach confirmed that Mancini’s position 
was “included in the Career Service category.”  Id. at 3388.  
Meanwhile, defendant Scomillio testified that, based on his 
research in 2013, he believed Mancini was not a member of 
                                              
 2  The nine exemptions from the career service are: 
(1) all elected officials; (2) the heads of agencies immediately 
under the direction and supervision of the County Executive; 
(3) one confidential or clerical employee for each of the 
above officials, except for members of the County Council; 
(4) the Clerk of Council and the staff of the County Council; 
(5) the members of authorities, boards, and commissions; (6) 
permanent, part-time professional employees; (7) provisional, 
probationary, and temporary employees; (8) officers and 
employees required to be included in a state merit or civil 
service system; and (9) officers and employees whose 
inclusion in the career service would be prohibited by the law 
of Pennsylvania.  J.A. 3325.   
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the career service and that she could be laid off as part of a 
reorganization.  But, he conceded, if it were determined that 
she was a career service employee, the County could not 
terminate her without just cause.   
 
B. Procedural History 
 
Mancini filed a Complaint in the District Court against 
Northampton County, Brown, and Scomillio (collectively, the 
“Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Relevant to these 
appeals, she alleged the Defendants violated her Fourteenth 
Amendment right to procedural due process when they 
terminated her without a pretermination hearing or just cause 
determination, and they violated her First Amendment rights 
when they terminated her based on her political affiliation.3  
The Defendants responded in their motion to dismiss that 
Mancini failed to state a claim on either theory because she 
was an exempt, or at-will, employee and her position was 
eliminated pursuant to a legitimate, cost-driven reorganization 
of the Solicitor’s Office.  Mancini countered that the 
“reorganization” was pretext for an unlawful termination and 
that, as a Northampton County career service employee, she 
was entitled to pretermination due process, which she did not 
receive.  The District Court denied the Defendants’ motion to 
dismiss. 
     
The Defendants moved for summary judgment on all 
claims.  They argued that Brown and Scomillio were entitled 
to qualified immunity because their actions did not violate 
                                              
 3  Mancini’s equal protection claims were dismissed 
before the case was submitted to the jury and are not a subject 
of these appeals. 
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any clearly established rights.  As to Mancini’s due process 
claims, they also argued that Mancini had failed to establish 
that she held a protected property interest in her position or 
that she was entitled to due process when her position was 
eliminated by reorganization.  The District Court granted 
Brown and Scomillio qualified immunity for all claims 
brought against them in their individual capacities.  As to the 
remaining claims, the court reserved judgment on the 
Defendants’ due process arguments and on all claims against 
Northampton. 
   
Mancini tried her claims against Northampton County, 
and Brown and Scomillio in their official capacities.  After a 
five-day trial, the jury returned a split verdict.  It found that 
Northampton violated Mancini’s procedural due process 
rights, but that Brown and Scomillio did not.  Significantly, 
the jury also found that Mancini’s full-time assistant county 
solicitor position was a career service position.  The jury 
found no violation of Mancini’s First Amendment rights.  The 
jury awarded Mancini $94,232 in damages and the District 
Court entered judgment consistent with the verdict.   
 
Northampton moved for judgment as a matter of law 
or a new trial under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  It asserted four bases for relief: (1) a miscarriage 
of justice would result if the verdict were allowed to stand 
because it was contrary to law, the evidence was insufficient 
to support the verdict, and the verdict was against the weight 
of the evidence; (2) the elimination of Mancini’s position fell 
within a so-called “reorganization exception” to constitutional 
procedural due process; (3) Northampton County law and 
policy do not require procedural due process where a position 
is eliminated as part of a reorganization; and (4) Pennsylvania 
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assistant county solicitors are employed at-will as a matter of 
law and are not entitled to pretermination procedural due 
process.  Northampton advances these same four arguments 
on appeal. 
   
The District Court denied Northampton’s Rule 50 
post-trial motion.  Over Northampton’s objections, the 
District Court granted Mancini $186,018.60 in attorney’s fees 
and costs as the prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  
These timely appeals followed.  In Appeal No. 2790, 
Northampton appeals the denial in part of its motion for 
summary judgment and the denial of its post-trial motion for 
judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.  In Appeal No. 15-
3012, Northampton appeals the District Court’s award of 
Mancini’s attorney’s fees and costs.4       
  
II.  
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this civil rights 
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343.  
We have jurisdiction over the final decisions of a district 
court.  28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
                                              
 4  Mancini cross-appealed seeking a new trial on her 
First Amendment claims (Appeal No. 15-2873), but at oral 
argument before this Court she withdrew her appeal, agreeing 
with the Court that a second trial would be redundant.  We 
therefore do not reach the issues she presented in her cross-
appeal.  In addition, even if Mancini had not withdrawn her 
cross-appeal, we have reviewed her arguments regarding her 
First Amendment claims and find those arguments 
unconvincing in view of the jury’s factual determinations.   
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 Our review of orders entered on motions for summary 
judgment is plenary.  See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 
767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014).  “‘[W]e may affirm the 
District Court on any grounds supported by the record,’ even 
if the court did not rely on those grounds.”  Id. (quoting 
Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000)).  “In 
considering an order entered on a motion for summary 
judgment, ‘we view the underlying facts and all reasonable 
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion.’”  Id. (quoting Pa. Coal Ass’n v. 
Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995)).  If the “non-
moving party fails sufficiently to establish the existence of an 
essential element of its case on which it bears the burden of 
proof at trial, there is not a genuine dispute with respect to a 
material fact and thus the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Id.   
 
 Our review of orders concerning post-trial motions for 
judgment as a matter of law is also plenary and we apply the 
same standard as the district court.  Lightning Lube, Inc. v. 
Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993).  The motion 
may be granted “only if, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the advantage 
of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient 
evidence from which a jury reasonably could find liability.”  
Id.  We “may not weigh the evidence, determine the 
credibility of witnesses, or substitute [our] version of the facts 
for the jury’s version.”  Id.  “Because the jury returned a 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff, we must examine the record 
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, giving her the benefit 
of all reasonable inferences, even though contrary inferences 
might reasonably be drawn.”  In re Lemington Home for the 
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Aged, 777 F.3d 620, 626 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Dudley v. S. 
Jersey Metal, Inc., 555 F.2d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1977)). 
 
 We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for 
abuse of discretion, unless it was based on an application of 
law, in which case our review is plenary.  McKenna v. City of 
Phila., 582 F.3d 447, 460 (3d Cir. 2009).  An abuse of 
discretion occurs if a “court’s decision rests upon a clearly 
erroneous finding of fact, errant conclusion of law or an 
improper application of law to fact” or “when no reasonable 
person would adopt the district court’s view.”  Blunt, 767 
F.3d at 265 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
 We similarly review the reasonableness of attorney’s 
fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for abuse of discretion.  
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1182 (3d Cir. 1990). 
   
III.  
 
A. Northampton County’s Appeal of the Due 
Process Judgment 
 
Northampton appeals the denial of its post-trial motion 
for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, and the partial 
denial of its motion for summary judgment.  The County 
reasserts on appeal the same four arguments it made in its 
post-trial motion.   
 
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence   
 
The District Court held that sufficient evidence 
supported the jury’s verdict that Northampton violated 
Mancini’s due process rights.  We agree. 
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In response to special interrogatories, the jury found by 
a preponderance of the evidence that “Jill Mancini’s position 
as a full time assistant county solicitor in Northampton 
County was a career service position” and that Northampton 
County “violated Jill Mancini’s due process rights by not 
providing her with a meaningful pre-termination opportunity 
to respond to the elimination of her position.”  J.A. 1634. 
   
Northampton did not challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting the jury’s finding that Mancini held a 
career service position.  See Br. of Northampton at 51-55.  
Northampton has therefore waived any such argument.  See 
Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler 
Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (“An issue is 
waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief”).  We 
accept in this appeal, as we must, that Mancini was in fact a 
career service employee.  See Lightning Lube, Inc., 4 F.3d at 
1166.  Nevertheless, given the significance of Mancini’s 
status as a career service employee to our decision, we review 
the evidence from which the jury could have concluded that 
Mancini was a career service employee.  
  
The plain text of the Northampton Home Rule Charter 
states that all non-exempt County employees are members of 
the career service.  Full-time professional employees are not 
listed among the exemptions, and none of the exemptions 
could fairly include a full-time permanent assistant county 
solicitor such as Mancini.  Karl Longenbach, the County 
Solicitor who headed the Solicitor’s Office when Mancini 
was hired and who presented the concept of a full-time 
assistant county solicitor to the County Council, testified that 
Mancini occupied a career service position.  Linda Markwith, 
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the Northampton Human Resources representative who 
handled Mancini’s hiring, further testified that the 
Northampton Human Resources information system 
designated Mancini as a member of the career service during 
the entire time she held the position.  Defendant Scomillio 
testified that even though he thought Mancini was an at-will 
employee, he and Brown decided to eliminate her position 
though a reorganization of the Solicitor’s Office, rather than 
terminating her like the other at-will employees they 
dismissed.  Based on these facts, had Northampton 
challenged this aspect of the jury’s verdict, we would have 
concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the 
finding that Mancini was a member of the Northampton 
County career service. 
 The evidence was also sufficient to establish that 
Northampton did not provide Mancini the meaningful process 
she was due.  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits a State from “depriv[ing] any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  For a discharged government 
employee to succeed on a violation of procedural due process 
claim, the employee must first prove that she possessed a 
constitutionally protected property right in her continued 
employment.  See Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 177 
(3d Cir. 2007).  A “unilateral expectation of continued 
employment” does not amount to a constitutionally protected 
property interest in one’s job.  Elmore v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 
279, 282 (3d Cir. 2005).  Where, however, an employee can 
only be fired for “just cause,” the employee develops a 
cognizable property interest in her continued employment, 
and the government may not fire her without providing 
procedural due process.  Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549 
F.3d 225, 230-32 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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 The Northampton Home Rule Charter provides that no 
member of the career service shall be “dismissed . . . except 
for just cause.”  See J.A. 3326.  We have already established 
that Mancini was a career service employee.  Because career 
service employees in Northampton can only be terminated for 
just cause, we conclude that Mancini had a protected property 
interest in her job, and she was entitled to notice and an 
opportunity to be heard on the cause for her termination prior 
to dismissal. 
   
 Fundamentally, procedural due process requires notice 
and an opportunity to be heard.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 333, 348 (1976).  The hearing must be “at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”  Id. at 333.  
Except in emergency situations not present here, procedural 
due process requires that when the government seeks to 
discharge an employee who possess a protected property 
interest in her job, “it must afford notice and opportunity for 
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case before the 
termination becomes effective.”  Dee, 549 F.3d at 232 
(emphasis added). 
   
 Mancini did not receive adequate due process.  Even 
now, Northampton maintains that, in light of the 
reorganization, it did not need just cause to terminate Mancini 
and that it would have been idle to provide her with due 
process.  Northampton is incorrect that no process was due.  
At a minimum, Mancini’s protected property interest in her 
continued employment entitled her to “notice of the charges 
against [her], an explanation of the [Defendants’] evidence, 
and an opportunity to present [her] side of the story.”  
Schmidt v. Creedon, 639 F.3d 587, 596 (3d Cir. 2011) 
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(quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 
546 (1985)).  The process she received was deficient on all 
fronts. 
     
Mancini was notified that the full-time assistant county 
solicitor position was being changed to a part-time position, 
but the Defendants did not inform her of their charges against 
her or their reasons for selecting her for dismissal.5  Without 
knowing the Defendants’ rationale for selecting her for layoff, 
Mancini was not able to present her side of the story.  
Furthermore, the Defendants did not hold a hearing on 
Mancini’s termination until after she was fired, despite the 
fact that she had promptly and properly availed herself of the 
Northampton grievance procedure several weeks before her 
termination.  We hold that this evidence was sufficient to 
support the jury’s verdict that Northampton did not provide 
Mancini a meaningful pre-termination opportunity to respond 
to her planned dismissal.  The finding was not contrary to 
law, and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Northampton a new trial on Mancini’s due process 
claims. 
   
2. A “Reorganization Exception” to Procedural 
Due Process? 
 
Northampton asks us to excuse its conduct by adopting 
and applying an exception to the ordinary requirements of 
constitutional procedural due process.  Northampton argues 
that “[a]lthough a property right and procedural due process 
                                              
5  Evidence supporting a finding that the purportedly 
neutral, cost-driven reorganization was in fact pretext for 
targeting Mancini is discussed in the next section. 
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typically go hand-in-hand triggering a requirement for some 
kind of hearing before discharge, [there is] a limited 
reorganization exception to due process that eliminates the 
need for a hearing where a reorganization or other cost-
cutting measure results in the dismissal of an employee.”  Br. 
of Northampton at 37 (alterations in original) (quoting 
Whalen v. Mass. Trial Ct., 397 F.3d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 2005)) 
(quotation marks omitted).  Northampton contends it was not 
required to provide Mancini with any procedural due process 
before, or after, it terminated her, because once the 
reorganization of the Solicitor’s Office occurred, Mancini’s 
position no longer existed.  Any challenge to the injustice of 
Mancini’s dismissal would have been “futile,” according to 
Northampton, because as a factual matter there was no longer 
room for her in the County government.  Id. at 39 (quoting 
Rodriguez-Sanchez v. Municipality of Santa Isabel, 658 F.3d 
125, 130 (1st Cir. 2011)).  
  
We have not previously considered the existence of 
this so-called “reorganization exception” to procedural due 
process, and we decline to apply any exception to 
Northampton’s conduct in this case.  Because the jury could 
have reasonably concluded that the reorganization of the 
Solicitor’s Office was pretext for unlawfully terminating 
Mancini, we do not reach the question of whether there are 
exceptions to the requirements of procedural due process 
where the government engages in a legitimate person-neutral 
reorganization. 
   
Although the jury was not directed to make a specific 
finding on pretext, the jury found that Northampton violated 
Mancini’s due process rights, and we agree with the District 
Court that Mancini presented sufficient evidence of pretext to 
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support that finding.  Mancini presented evidence from which 
a jury could reasonably conclude that the Defendants’ 
purported concern for cost-savings did not actually animate 
the reorganization.  There was ample evidence that the 
Defendants decided to eliminate the two full-time assistant 
county solicitor positions, and replace them with part-time 
positions, based not on identity-neutral, cost-driven reasons, 
but based on their knowledge of Mancini and the people who 
would come to occupy the part-time positions.6 
    
Evidence of pretext included the following.  Scomillio 
and Brown decided to reorganize the Solicitor’s Office 
shortly after Brown was elected County Executive in 
November 2013, even before he took office.  Brown testified 
that when he asked Scomillio to consider a reorganization, 
Brown did not know what the budget of the Solicitor’s Office 
was and he did not have any personal knowledge of whether 
the office was running efficiently.  Without any investigation, 
without asking Human Resources to conduct a desk audit to 
determine the volume of work, and without looking at 
solicitors offices in comparable counties, Scomillio 
recommended, based on his knowledge of who was on the 
staff of the Solicitor’s Office, that they shift the work of the 
                                              
 6  Northampton is incorrect in its view that the jury 
found that the reorganization of the Solicitor’s Office was 
legitimate.  The jury found that Mancini’s political affiliation 
was not a substantial or motivating factor in the elimination 
of her position.  However, this does not rule out a multitude 
of other improper bases for her termination, including the 
possibility that Northampton orchestrated a sham 
reorganization to target Mancini and circumvent the process 
she was due as a member of the career service. 
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full-time solicitors to part-time solicitors.  Scomillio had 
experience with the individuals he planned to hire as part-
time solicitors and he believed they would work more 
efficiently than the existing staff.   
   
When they decided to conduct the reorganization, 
Brown and Scomillio had concerns about the competency of 
the Solicitor’s Office in general, and about Mancini in 
particular.  Brown testified that the “reputation of the 
[Solicitor’s Office] was not strong.”  J.A. at 2496.  Scomillio 
testified that his prior experience with Mancini, when she 
worked in the district attorney’s office, “wasn’t good” and he 
“didn’t come off with a good experience about her abilities.”  
Id. 2657.  Scomillio had no interest in keeping Mancini on 
staff after she reacted negatively to his suggestion of a 
reorganization and informed him that she could only be fired 
for cause.  Scomillio also testified that Daniel Spengler, his 
predecessor,7 advised him to retain the position of full-time 
assistant solicitor but was “equivocal at best regarding his 
feeling about Attorney Mancini and her . . . work ability.”  
J.A. at 2650.  Instead of taking Spengler’s advice to keep the 
full-time positions but not Mancini, the Defendants 
eliminated the full-time positions and told Mancini that her 
job no longer existed.  They redistributed Mancini’s work to 
part-time solicitors—both old and new—without giving her 
the option to remain employed with the County. 
   
 Evidence that Northampton failed to comply with its 
Layoff Policy casts further doubt on its claim that it engaged 
                                              
 7  Longenbach resigned as County Solicitor at the end 
of 2012.  Daniel Spengler was appointed to serve the final 
year of Longenbach’s term.  
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in a bona fide reorganization plan.  Under the Layoff Policy, 
career service employees are entitled to retention priority over 
part-time employees, to notice of existing vacancies and the 
right to displace less senior employees in the same or lower 
job title, and to be placed on a recall list to fill subsequent 
vacancies in the same or lower job title.  The Layoff Policy 
thus favors regular and full-time career service employees 
over part-time employees, and requires the County to give 
notice of vacancies to career service employees who are 
subject to layoff.  Despite these enumerated rights, 
Northampton laid-off Mancini, a regular, full-time career 
service employee, and distributed her work to part-time 
employees of the same title without allowing her to displace a 
less senior assistant county solicitor or to assume one of the 
newly created positions. 
   
 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Mancini and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, 
the evidence was more than sufficient for a jury to determine 
that the Defendants targeted Mancini based on her personal 
performance, and that the reorganization was pretext for 
firing her.  Northampton’s argument that “pre-termination 
hearings are not required by due process where a bona fide 
government reorganization plan bases dismissals on factors 
unrelated to personal performance” is therefore misplaced.  
Br. of Northampton at 39 (quoting Rodriguez-Sanchez, 658 
F.3d at 130) (emphasis added).  The cases on which 
Northampton relies do not apply where a reorganization was 
pretextual.  See id. at 35-40.8 
                                              
 8  In Whalen v. Massachusetts Trial Court, the First 
Circuit held that a “limited ‘reorganization exception’” did 
not apply to a court clerk because his job performance and 
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other individual qualifications were decisive factors in the 
decision of the Springfield District Court to terminate him 
during a deficit-driven layoff.  397 F.3d at 22-26.  The First 
Circuit held that the Government violated Whalen’s due 
process rights because it targeted him, not his position, in the 
layoff.  Id. at 25-26.  Similarly, Mancini was one of only two 
people “reorganized” out of a job in the Solicitor’s Office and 
there was evidence that the Defendants targeted her based on 
her individual qualifications and not her position.       
In Rodriguez-Sanchez v. Municipality of Santa Isabel, 
the First Circuit did permit the government to lay off 
employees during a reorganization without the process they 
were otherwise due, but the neutral reduction in force in that 
case bears little resemblance to the evidence Mancini 
presented.  See 658 F.3d at 132.  Rodriguez-Sanchez involved 
the claims of ninety-eight terminated employees of the 
Municipality of Santa Isabel, Puerto Rico.  See id. at 129.  An 
independent accounting firm determined that Santa Isabel’s 
$7 million deficit was largely due to the size of the city’s 
workforce.  Id. at 127, 130.  There was no question that the 
system-wide layoff plan alleviated the deficit problem.  Id. at 
130.  Significantly, the record in Rodriguez-Sanchez was 
devoid of evidence of pretext, and the mayor had no 
knowledge of the identities of the individuals selected for 
layoff.  Id. at 130-31.  The First Circuit was thus satisfied that 
Santa Isabel had engaged in a bona fide reduction in force in 
response to a deficit crisis.  Id. at 130-32.  Unlike the system-
wide, identity-neutral layoff scenario the First Circuit 
confronted in Rodriguez-Sanchez, Mancini was one of only 
two solicitors laid-off for purported budgetary reasons, and 
her identity was well known to County Executive Brown.  
There was no independent evaluation of the cost-savings that 
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Finally, we reject Northampton’s argument that a “due 
process claim is not available if a layoff was made pursuant to 
a reorganization in fact, regardless of a possible improper 
motive behind the reorganization.”  See Reply Br. of 
Northampton at 23.  We are aware of no court that has 
permitted the government to subvert the requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment with a sham reorganization.  If the 
government were allowed to undertake sham reorganizations 
to dismiss an employee who was otherwise entitled to due 
process, Northampton’s proposed “reorganization exception” 
would eviscerate a public employee’s procedural due process 
rights altogether. 
   
In conclusion, we will not permit the government to 
target an individual for dismissal and then violate that 
individual’s procedural due process rights under the guise of a 
reorganization.  “To hold otherwise would allow government 
officials to cry ‘reorganization’ in order to circumvent the 
constitutional and statutory protections guaranteed” to 
government employees who may only be fired for cause.  
Misek v. City of Chicago, 783 F.2d 98, 101 (7th Cir. 1986).  
There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could 
conclude that the reorganization was a pretext for targeting 
Mancini.  Northampton was therefore not exempt from 
providing Mancini, a protected career service employee, with 
procedural due process when it selected her for dismissal. 
   
3. Northampton County’s Grievance Procedure 
 
                                                                                                     
would result from the Defendants’ plan, and there was 
evidence that the Defendants considered Mancini’s individual 
qualifications when selecting her for layoff.  
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 Northampton next argues that its own law and policy 
contain a reorganization exception that permitted the County 
to terminate Mancini without providing her procedural due 
process.  See Br. of Northampton at 40-45.  The District 
Court properly denied Northampton’s request for judgment as 
a matter of law on this basis.  The Northampton Home Rule 
Charter, Grievance Policy, and Layoff Policy entitled 
Mancini to a hearing before the Personnel Appeals Board to 
challenge the legitimacy of her discharge, despite the 
purported reorganization. 
 
 The Northampton Home Rule Charter, as discussed 
above, establishes the right of career service employees to 
remain employed, except on a finding of “just cause.”  The 
Charter makes no exception or special provision for 
reorganizations.  Mancini, as a member of the Northampton 
career service, was therefore entitled to a pretermination just 
cause determination, regardless of any bona fide 
reorganization plan.  See Dee, 549 F.3d at 232; Elmore, 399 
F.3d at 282. 
 
 Under Northampton County Employee Policy No. 
3.15, “Grievance Procedure” (the “Grievance Policy”), career 
service employees have the right to appeal “a suspension or 
discharge from employment,” or to challenge “an alleged 
violation of the County’s Home Rule Charter, Administrative 
Code, Career Service Regulations, County policy, or 
departmental procedure relating to terms and conditions of 
employment.”  J.A. 3374.  The four-step escalated grievance 
process culminates in a formal hearing before the 
Northampton County Personnel Appeals Board.  Id. at 3376-
78.  Following the hearing, the Board must issue to the parties 
a final written adjudication that contains the “findings and 
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reasons as adopted by the majority of the Board.”  Id. at 3378.  
Like the Home Rule Charter, the Grievance Policy contains 
no exceptions for employment actions taken as part of a 
reorganization or cost-driven layoff.  Mancini, a career 
service employee, properly filed a grievance after receiving 
notice of her impending dismissal.  She alleged wrongful 
discharge, unlawful discrimination, and violations of 
Northampton’s Career Service Regulations and Layoff 
Policy.  She was therefore entitled to pursue her claims 
through the Northampton County grievance process. 
 
Northampton boldly asserts that its Layoff Policy 
“does not offer a right to due process in response to a 
legitimate reorganization.”  Br. of Northampton at 43.  The 
Layoff Policy, however, does not provide the escape hatch 
Northampton seeks.  It, too, entitled Mancini to due process.  
The Layoff Policy governs dismissals where the “County may 
need to institute a Reduction in Force (RIF, Layoff) due to 
economy, efficiency, restructuring, reorganization, or other 
related reasons.”  J.A. 3380.  By its own terms, the policy 
applies “to all County employees.”  Id.9  The Layoff Policy 
permits employees to appeal a layoff to the Personnel 
Appeals Board on the grounds that the “Career Service 
Regulations were not followed, or that the decision to select 
this layoff unit was arbitrary, capricious, or a violation of 
law.”  Id. at 3383.  Mancini was therefore entitled under the 
                                              
 9  The Layoff Policy applies to all County employees, 
“except where collective bargaining agreements, 
Pennsylvania State regulations, and/or State Civil Service 
regulations conflict,” but none of these exceptions are 
implicated here.  J.A. 3380. 
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policy to appeal her discharge precisely because the County 
called it a layoff.  Mancini’s grievance specifically referenced 
violations of the Career Service Regulations as well as 
violations of the Layoff Policy.  If, as Northampton 
maintains, Mancini was dismissed pursuant to a layoff, under 
the Layoff Policy she was entitled to a hearing on her claims.  
We reject Northampton’s selective reading of its own laws. 10  
We hold instead that those laws required the County to 
provide Mancini with a pretermination hearing.11    
*** 
 
 In sum, we agree with the District Court that 
Northampton County is not entitled to a judgment that, as a 
matter of law, it was not required to provide Mancini with 
procedural due process prior to terminating her employment.  
We will therefore affirm the orders of the District Court 
                                              
 10  We note the irony of Northampton’s argument that 
the Layoff Policy deprived Mancini of rights, when in fact, as 
discussed above, the policy enumerates the array of rights and 
privileges Northampton grants to full-time career service 
employees in the event of a reduction in force. 
   
 11  We also find no merit to Northampton’s contention 
that Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1981), dictates 
the outcome of Mancini’s Due Process claims.  Ness 
concerned the First Amendment rights of solicitors for the 
City of York, who, under that city’s administrative code, were 
political appointees and could be terminated at-will.  Id. at 
521-22.  Contrary to Northampton’s suggestion, we have 
never held that every town or county solicitor in Pennsylvania 
is employed at-will as a matter of law. 
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denying Northampton’s motion for summary judgment and 
denying its post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law 
or a new trial. 
 
B. Attorney’s Fees 
 
 Over Northampton’s objection, the District Court 
awarded Mancini $186,018.60 in attorney’s fees and costs as 
the prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  Northampton 
argues that Mancini’s requested attorney’s fees were not 
reasonable because she “prevailed only minimally, on a single 
claim out of 15 available claims, receiving a jury award that 
was 5% of the damages requested.”  Br. of Northampton at 
55; see id. at 55-58; Reply Br. of Northampton at 31-32 
(“Plaintiff was negligibly successful, recovering $94,232 
where she had sought nearly two million dollars.”).12  The 
District Court reduced the fees by the amount Mancini’s 
counsel incurred preparing for oral argument on her post-trial 
motion ($1,627.67), and subtracted an additional $126 to 
adjust for a duplicative entry on a bill.  After these 
adjustments, the District Court awarded Mancini her 
requested fees, explaining that “[t]he Supreme Court . . . has 
expressly rejected the County’s proffered ‘mathematical 
                                              
 12  Northampton does not contest the reasonableness of 
Mancini’s lawyers’ rates.  See Br. of Northampton at 55-58.  
Northampton also does not contest the reasonableness of the 
award of costs and expenses.  See id.  These issues are 
therefore waived.  See Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-
CIO, 26 F.3d at 398. 
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approach.’”  J.A. 37-8 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 
424, 435, n.11 (1983)).   
  
 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a “prevailing plaintiff” in a 
civil rights action should ordinarily recover her attorney’s 
fees.  See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429.  A plaintiff is a 
“prevailing party” for the purposes of an attorney’s fee award 
if she succeeds “on any significant issue in litigation which 
achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing 
suit.”  Truesdell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 290 F.3d 159, 163 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433).  Where a 
plaintiff does not succeed on every claim, the Supreme Court 
has rejected a fee calculation approach that compares the total 
number of issues in the case with the number of issues on 
which the plaintiff prevailed.  See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 
n.11.  Rather, where the plaintiff’s claims involve a “common 
core of facts,” or are based on “related legal theories,” but the 
plaintiff obtained only partial or limited success, the district 
court may choose to reduce the award if a full compensatory 
fee would be unreasonable in consideration of the degree of 
success obtained.  Id. at 435-36.  How to measure the degree 
of success is left to the district court’s discretion.  Id. at 436-
37. 
   
 The District Court in this case held that Mancini’s 
claims all shared “a common core of facts” because “[a]ll 
three claims emerged from how and why Mancini was 
terminated from her employment.”  J.A. 38.  Furthermore, 
Mancini “prevailed on a crucial issue which informed 
inquiries into all three claims and occupied much of the 
trial testimony: The jury found she was a career service 
employee.”  Id.   The District Court therefore concluded that 
“although Mancini ultimately prevailed only on one claim 
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and received a portion of the relief she sought, reduction 
would be inappropriate because her claims are 
interconnected.”  Id. 
   
 The District Court did not abuse its discretion.  
Mancini prevailed on her due process claim against 
Northampton as well as a central issue in the case.  There was 
substantial overlap in the evidence required to prove 
Mancini’s due process, First Amendment, and equal 
protection claims, including the circumstances surrounding 
the creation of the full-time assistant solicitor positions and 
the decision to eliminate those positions and replace them 
with part-time assistant solicitors.  The District Court 
considered the extent of Mancini’s success and made a 
reasoned judgment that the time Mancini’s attorneys spent on 
her unsuccessful claims did not warrant a reduced fee.  
Finding no abuse of discretion, we will affirm the District 
Court’s award of attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses. 
 
 
 
 
IV.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment and we will dismiss Mancini’s cross-
appeal.  
